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S O C I A L I S M  
B Y  P A U L  M .  S W E E Z Y  
Mr. Chairman and Ladies and Gentlemen: I t  is not my habit 
to read prepared lectures, and I would prefer not to do it tonight. 
In view of the extraordinary publicity which has surrounded this event, 
however, I could not refuse the request of the press and wire services 
for an advance text. And in view of the no less extraordinary interest 
which certain official quarters have in the past shown in whatever 
I happen to say at the University of New Hampshire, I think it may 
be wisest to stick to the text so that at any rate there need be no 
disagreement about what I am saying tonight. 
First, let me say that I am very happy to be here at the Uni- 
versity of New Hampshire again. For several years up to and in- 
cluding 1954, it was my privilege and pleasure to come here every 
spring to lecture in the humanities course and to participate in less 
formal student and faculty discussions. Due to circumstances over 
which neither I nor anyone here at the University had any control, 
these visits were interrupted-to my loss and regret. I hope tonight's 
meeting marks the renewal of an association which I have always 
found both enjoyable and fruitful. 
But there is another reason why I am glad to be here tonight. 
Through no virtue (or fault) of mine, my appearance on the campus 
at this time has become a clear test of the quality of academic 
freedom that exists at the University of New Hampshire. Academic 
freedom, let me remind you, is not, at bottom, a matter of my freedom 
to speak my mind. That freedom, I am glad to say, I still have; 
and nothing has yet prevented me from making use of it. Academic 
freedom is fundamentally the freedom of the academic community 
to employ or otherwise bring before it anyone whose ideas and opinions 
it may think of interest or importance. It is a part, and a very im- 
portant part, of the freedom of the sovereign people to educate itself 
for the responsibility of governing, and as such it is protected by the 
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. The 
This is a slightly revised text of a speech delivered at the University 
of New Hampshire on M a y  22, 1956. 
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of man, of society, and of history. It bears th 
a b a n  who was born in 1818 
the latter half of his life in London. Marx 
learning and enormously powerfuI intellect, one of the greatest! 
thinkers not only of the nineteenth century but of all recorded histoq.; 
Marx combined in his system of ideas the realistic philoso&;! 
of the English and French Enlightenment, the comprehensive as&/: 
dynamic point of view of the Gennan idealists and particularly, .of;, 
Hegel, and the hardheaded and* of the capitalist economy which( 
we owe to the great British classical economists. The result was a: 
brilliant new synthesis which is both highly original and at 
time stands squarely in the mainstream of modem intellec 
velopment from the Renaissance onward. Here, in desperate 
are what I understand to be the central elements of the Mami 
of society and history: 
6 
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The universe is real knd existed for eons before there was human 
life, or for that matter life of any kind, on our planet. Life here 
on the earth is a natural by-pduct of the earth's cooling, and 
humanity is the result of a long process $of ev0Eution. In the earliest 
stages of society, human labor was still so unproductive that it 
yielded no surplus aver and above the requiremenb of life and rp 
production. As long as this was true, men lived in a state of primitive 
cornmuni-perating, sharing, fighting, but not yet exploiting 
each other. 
Later, techniques improved so much that a man could produce 
a surpIus over and above what he needed for himself, and from this 
dates the beginning of economic exploitation and social classes. When 
one tribe fought and defeated another, it was now worthwhile to take 
captive the vanquished and force them to work for the victors. Some 
men became rulers living off the surplus produced by others; while 
the actual producers lost their independence and spent their lives 
toiling for their mastus. It  was in this way that exploitation of man 
by man and the divhidn of society into classes originated. 
But the form of enplotation has not r e m ~ d  unchanged- 
indeed, nothing remains unchanged, everything is in a constant state 
of flux. The exploiten seek to expand the surplus at their &pod, 
and with this end in view they invent and introduce new and better 
techniques of production; the exploited seek to improve their condi- 
tion and therefore carry on a never-ending struggle to enlarge their 
' share of the product. As a result the forms of exploitation change, 
and with them the whole structure of society. At first it was slavery, 
in which the laborer is the property of his master. Next came serfdom, 
in which the laborer has attained a certain degree of freedom but 
is still tied to the soil. And finally there is wage labor, in which the 
laborer is legally entirely free but must work for the profit of others 
because he lacks means of production of his own. 
A society based on private ownership of the means of production 
and wage labor is called capitalism. I t  came into the world fist in 
England and certain parts of Western Europe, not all at once but 
gradually and painfully between the sixteenth and nineteenth cen- 
turies. It brought with it social and political upheavals, new ways 
of thinking, and a deep awareness of the vast creative potentials 
of human labor and industry. Historically speaking, capitalism was 
a long leap forward. In the words of the Communist Manifesto: "It 
has been the first to show what man's activity can bring about. It 
has'accomplished wonders far surpassing Egyptian pyramids, Roman 
aqueducts, and Gothic cathedrals; it has conducted expeditions that 
put in the shade all former migrations and crusades." 
But capitalism contains within itself what Marx called contra- 
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dictions which prevent it from f d y  realizing the potentials which 
it was the first to uncover. The capitalist class, comprising those who 
own the instruments of production and set them in motion, is and 
must be concerned with making profits, not with the general welfare. 
Capitalists subordinate other aims to the maximbation of profit. In 
pursuit of this objective, they pay workers as little as they can get 
away with and steadily introduce labor-saving machinery. The conse- 
is to hold dawn the c o m d g  power of the work- 
time, the capitalists restrict their own consump- 
accumulating more and more capitd. But ac- 
ore h d  more capita means adding to society's produc- 
. We, the&ore3 have the paradox that capitalism steps 
as far as cowump~& is concerned and on the accelerator 
fat as production is concerned. This is its-basic contradiction, and 
cannot be eliminated except through changing the system from one 
f production for pmfit to one of productim for use. 
On the basis of this analpie, Marx believed that it was to the 
interest of the workers to organize themselves politically in order 
eventually to gain power and replace capitalism by a system based 
upon common ownership of the means of production and economic 
planning, a system to which he and his followers came in time to 
give the name of socialism.. Moreover, Manr had no doubt that the 
workers would in fact follow this course, and that their growing num- 
b- importance, and discipline under capitalism would sooner or 
later ensure their victory. As to how the transition would be effected, 
Marx at first thought that it would have to be everywhere by means 
af a violent revolution. But as political democracy spread, especially 
in the English-speaking countries, he modified this view and in the 
last debdes of his life believed that a peaceful and legal transition 
was quite possible in some countries and under some conditions. "We 
know,' he said in a speech at Amsterdam in 1872, "that special re- 
gard must be paid to the institutions, customs, and traditions of 
various lands; and we do not deny that there are certain countries, 
such as the United States and England, in which the workers may 
hope to achieve their ends by peaceful means." 
What b Socialism? 
So much then for Marxism. Naturally, my account is oversim- 
plified and very incomplete, but I hope it may serve to give you 
some idea of the scope and quality of Marx's thought--so differeat 
from the impressions which demagogic opponents have always sought 
to convey. Let us now ask: What is socialism? 
Socialism, according to Marx, is the form of society which wiH 
succeed capitalism, just as capitalism is the form of society which- 
succeeded feudalism. 
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The fundamental change would consist in the abolition of pri- 
vate ownership of the means of production. Please note that neither 
Marx nor (so far as I know) any other modern socialist of irnpor- 
tance ever advocated or expected that private ownership of consumer 
goods would or should be abolished. On the contrary, he favored 
the multiplication of consumer goods in the hands of the lower- 
income groups, hence a great extension of private ownership in this 
sphere. 
As to the form of ownership of the means of production which 
would characterize socialism, Marxists have never been dogmatic. 
Ownership must be by public bodies, but that does not necessarily 
mean only the central government: local governments, special public 
authorities of one sort or another, and cooperatives can also own 
means of production under socialism. And there can even be a certain 
amount of private ownership, provided it is confined to industries 
in which production takes place on a small scale. 
A corollary of public ownership of the means of production is 
economic planning. The capitalist economy is governed by the mar- 
ket, that is to say, by private producers responding to price move- 
ments with a view to maximizing their own profits. I t  is through 
this mechanism that supply and demand are adjusted to each other 
and productive resources are allocated to various industries and 
branches of production. But public bodies have no compelling reason 
to maximize their profits (though, admittedly, under certain circum- 
stances they may be directed to make as much profit as they can). 
In general, therefore, they must have some other principle to guide 
' their economic conduct, and this can only be the following of a plan 
which coordinates the activities of all the public bodies. 
Now socialists claim that it is precisely the freedom from the 
necessity to make profits and the coordination of all economic ac- 
tivities by a general plan which allows socialism to overcome the con- 
tradictions of capitalism and to develop its resources and technology 
for the greatest good of the people as a whole. Under such a system, 
crises and unemployment could only result from bad planning; and 
while bad planning is certainly not impossible, especially in the early 
stages of socialist society, there is no reason why planners should not 
learn to correct their mistakes and to reduce the resulting maladjust- 
ments and disproportions to smaller and smaller dimensions. 
What about the non-economic aspects of socialism? Here Marx 
had a well-developed theory. He expected socialism to come first in 
the more advanced industrialized countries and to build on the politi- 
cal foundations which they had already achieved. Since in such coun- 
tries the workers were in a majority, he believed that the taking of 
political power by the working class would mean full democracy 
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and liberty for most of the people, though he also expected that 
there would be a period of greater or lesser duration when the rights 
and freedoms of the former exploiters would be subject to certain 
restrictions. As to the longer-run future, he reasoned that the full 
development of society's economic potential under socialism would 
gradually raise the well-being and education of everyone so that 
eventually all classes and class distinctions would be done away 
with. When that happened-but not before-the state as a repressive 
apparatus for dealing with class and other forms of social conflict 
would '%ither away." The final goal of Marx and his followers 
can therefore be said to be the same as that of the philosophical 
anarchists. I t  would be a state of society in which, to quote Marx's 
words, "the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all" and in which distribution takes place according 
. to the principle "from each according to his ability, to each according 
to his need." 
Others before Marx had had a similar vision of a good society 
to cornea society of abundance and brotherhood in place of the 
society of scarcity and alienation which the human race had always 
been condemned to live in. What particularly distinguished Marx 
from his predecessors is that he purported to prove that this society 
of the future, which he called socialism, is not only a dream and 
a hope but is in fact the next stage of historical evolution. It would 
not come automatically, to be sure-not as the result of the blind 
decrees of fate. I t  would come rather as the result of the conscious, 
organized activity of working people, the vast majority of mankind. 
Given this perspective, the task of the humanitarian could only be 
to devote his energies to educating and organizing the working class 
to fulfil its historic mission. That, in a word, is what Marxists have 
been trying to do for nearly a hundred years now. 
Was Man Right? 
Marx's prophetic forecast of the end of capitalism and the open- 
ing of a new era in human history was given to the world in the 
Communist Manifesto in 1848. More than a century has passed since. 
Do the facts of this intervening period permit us to say whether 
Marx was right or wrong? 
In the broadest sense, I do not see how it can be denied that 
Marx has been brilliantly vindicated. A mighty socialist movement 
based on the working class grew up during his lifetime. The crises 
of capitalism, far from abating, grew in intensity and violence, cul- 
minating in the holocausts of two world wars. Beginning with the 
Russian Revolution of 1917, more and more of the earth's population 
has withdrawn from the orbit of capitalism and has undertaken to 
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reconstruct its economy and society on the basis of public ownership 
and planning. Today, something like a third of the human race has 
definitively abandoned private enterprise and, under Communist lead- 
ership, is building up a network of planned economies. 
But it is not only in Communist-led countries that this is hap- 
pening, though elsewhere the pace is slower. Since World War 11, 
Great Britain has moved a considerable distance along the road to 
a socialized economy, and one of the two big political parties is a 
socialist party. Even more recently, India, next to Communist China 
the most populous country in the world, has adopted a Five Year 
Plan which the sober London Times calls "India's Socialist Plan." 
The fact is that over most of the world's surface the trend is 
now visibly away from private enterprise and toward public owner- 
ship of the means of production, away from market-dominated econ- 
omies and toward economic planning. Only in the United States and 
a few countries closely allied to the United States does the trend seem 
to be in the other direction. Here, it is true, the socialist movement 
is at a low ebb, and private enterprise is very much in the saddle. 
Should we perhaps conclude that Marx was right for the rest 
of the world but wrong for the United States? Are we the great 
exception? Or are we merely lagging somewhat behind in a move- 
ment which eventually will be as universal as Marx predicted it 
would? 
These are crucial questions, especially for us Americans. In 
w h t  time remains to me, I shall attempt to indicate some possible 
answers. 
There is one respect, and it is an important one, in whieh Marx 
was certainly wrong. As I noted earlier, he expected socialism to come 
first in the most advanced industrial countries. I t  did not. For 
reasons having to do with the late 19th- and early 20th-century de- 
velopment of relations between the advanced countries and the 
colonial and semi-colonial backward countries, the revolutionary move- 
ment grew more rapidly and had more opportunities in the back- 
ward than in the advanced regions. When the capitalist system was 
wracked by the destruction and disasters of the two world wars, it 
broke at its weakest points not at its strongest, Socialism came first to 
the Tsarist Empire, and spread from there to Eastern Europe and 
China. 
This has, of course, meant that the early stages of the develop- 
ment of socialism have been very different from what Manr foresaw. 
The new order could not build directly on the achievements of 
the old. It had no developed industrial base, no educated and trained 
labor force, no political democracy. It had to start from scratch and 
work under conditions of utmost difficulty. 
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Many people, including Marxists, expected socialism to proceed 
at once, or at any rate within a short time, to achieve its great goals: 
an economy of abundance, increasing democracy and freedom for 
the workers, a richer life for all. It  could have happened that way 
if Britain, Germany, and the United States had been the first great 
socialist countries. But it could not possibly happen that way in back- 
ward Russia standing alone for a whole generation. The industrial 
base had to be built, and that meant belt-tightening. The Russians 
had no traditions of democracy and civil liberty, and under the dif- 
ficult conditions of the '20s and '30s it was natural that a new police 
state should arise on the foundations of the old Tsarist police state. 
Moreover, like all police states this one committed excesses and 
horrors which had little if anything to do with the central tasks of 
construction the regime had set itself. 
Under these circumstances, socialism in practice had little at- 
traction for the people of the advanced countries. The standard of 
- - 
living of those living under it remained abysmally low, and political 
conduct, both among leaders and between leaders and people, often 
seemed closer to oriental despotism than to enlightened socialism. It 
was widely assumed in the West either that the Soviet Union was not 
socialist at all, or that socialism had been tried and failed. 
In the underdeveloped countries, however, the USSR made a 
very different impression. They saw rapid economic advance, a vast 
process of popular education, some improvement in living standards- 
and never having experienced democracy themselves, they hardly no- 
ticed its absence in Russia. Communism was imposed on Eastern 
Europe by the Red Army chasing Hitler back to Berlin, but in China 
it was the product of a great popular revolution. And it is now 
expanding its influence throughout the underdeveloped regions of 
the world. 
The Competition of the Systems 
The two systems of capitalism and socialism exist side by side 
in the world today. They are competing for the support and emulation 
of the backward and uncommitted countries. They are also competing 
in terms of absolute performance. How will this contest turn out? 
Will those now in the capitalist camp remain there? Or will they 
tend to join the socialist camp as time goes on? And finally, what 
about the United States, the leader of the capitalist camp? 
These are questions which every serious person in the world 
is asking today. I predict that they will be increasingly the center 
of attention in the years and decades ahead. 
The answers, I think, will depend very largely on the relative 
success of the two systems in the following fields: production and 
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income, education, and liberty. I believe that socialism will win out 
in this great world-shaking contest, and I am going to conclude my 
talk by trying to give you some of the reasons why I hold this view. 
I should add perhaps that I don't expect you to agree with me at 
this stage of the game. The decisive forces and trends are still operat- 
ing for the most part below the surface, and it will be some time yet 
before they can be seen and evaluated by all. But I hope that I may 
succeed in making you think seriously about these matters. It  is, I 
believe, important that Americans should be put on notice that things 
are happening in the world, and will increasingly happen, which con- 
tradict their established thought patterns and expectations. You may 
not believe me yet, but at any rate if you pay serious attention to 
what I say you should not be surprised when things turn out dif- 
ferently from the way you have been taught to expect. 
Let us first look at the relative performance of the two systems 
in the economic field proper. It  will be generally agreed, I suppose, 
that United States capitalism has been doing about as well as can 
be expected in the last decade. Let us assume for the sake of the 
argument that it continues to do as well (though I myself think 
a good case can be made out for the view that this is too favorable 
an assumption for capitalism). Let us also assume that the USSR 
continues to grow at about its present rate, though I believe this is 
likely to be an under- rather than an over-estimate. On these assump 
tions, what will be the outcome of the economic competition between 
the systems? 
The answer is clear and unambiguous. Here is the way the Ox- 
ford economist, Peter Wiles, put the matter in a broadcast over the 
BBC last fall (I am quoting from the October 20th, 1955, issue of 
The Listener, weekly publication of the BBC) : 
Perhaps the most important fact in all modern economics 
is that the rate of growth of productivity is higher in the Soviet 
Union than in any important free country at the period of its 
maximum development, let alone now. That is, whether we take 
roughly comparable circumstances or the present circumstances, 
the Soviet superiority remains. The best performance by a large 
non-Communist economy for a long period together appears to 
be that of Japan: between 1912 and 1937 she grew by about 
3 percent per annum. The Soviet economy grew by about 5% 
percent per annurn before the war and by about 7% percent since 
1948. For mining and manufacturing alone . . . the figures are: 
Japan 7 percent, USSR 12 percent. 
We see that the overwhelming Communist superiority in 
industry alone leads to a great overall superiority (in the whole 
national income). The effect of compound interest is very great 
over a few decades. Thus, growing 3 percent per annum faster 
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than the United States, the USSR could catch up from a start- . #  
ing point of half the United States national income per head in '' 
23 years. : j 
e 
These facts are not widely known in the United States, I am i; 
sorry to say, but there is no doubt about thdr authenticity. Thuq ,#! 
for example, the New York Times of a few days ago (May 18) 'i 
quotes Mr. Hugh Gaitskell, leader of the British Labor Party and 'a 
himself a trained economist, as having told the Convention of the :$ 
International Ladies Garment Workers Union, meeting in Atlantic 
City, that "Soviet national income was going up 10 percent a year,!, 
double the United States 'rate." If this continues, the USSR t 
' 2 
overtake and surpass the United States in per capita income in about .$ 
four more Five Year Plans. $3 
( 5  
Let us turn now to our second field of competition, education. . i:! 
I' Developments here are no less startling, and unfortunately no better ;I 
known, than in the field of economics proper. So far as the Soviet ;{ 
Union is concerned, I can do no better than quote from what former 
I? 2 
Senator William Benton of Connecticut wrote in the New York T i w ~  
Sunday magazine section on April 1, 1956, after a trip to the Soviet :j Union to study educational developments there : ;I$ 
What i s  it that most impresses the foreign observer about 
the Soviet school system? In less than forty years, starting with , ; 
a population about 50 percent illiterate, the Soviets have built I 
a seven-year primary schools system rivalling our own in uni- 
versality, with nearly 100 percent enrollment. 
Since World War 11, the Soviet secondary school system has : 
mushroomed amazingly. By 1960 the basic ten-year school is 
to be compulsory everywhere. In spite of acute labor shortages, 
all children an to be kept in school from 7 to 17. Every Russian 
youngster is to be given an education-a Communist education, - ? 
f 
of course, but comparable in its high standards of study and 
learning to an English public school or a French lycee. . . . I I! 4
Further, the USSR is on the road to surpassing the US both -4 
in the number and percentage of students enrolled in institutions '!! 
above the secondary level. Indeed, when high level extension- 
1 
correspondence students are included, the Soviet total of 4,300,000 ,A 
enrolled in 1955 is already 70 percent aver our ?,700,WO. The :i Soviet Union offers as much traming to every boy and girl as hit 
' J 
or her talents and abilities will absorb. . . . ,I 
Eighty to 90 percent of all students at Soviet higher institu- 
I,: 1 
tions have been on state scholarships, which included stipends - t ;? 
rising slightly from year to year. In February we learned from .,,:I 
the Party Congress that beginning this autumn aU education is 4 
to be free. ; 
B 
: 2: 






of the English public schwl and the French lycee are far above the 
average of our public schools. 
The results of this enomous educational program are already 
beginning to show. According to Sir John Cockroft, head of Britain's 
Atomic Energy Establishment at Hawell, "Britain's output of gradu- 
ate engineers was about 2,800 a year, while the figure for the United 
States was 23,000 and for the Soviet 53,000." (New York T k ,  April 
14, 1956.) In  other words, the USSR is already turning out more 
than twice as many engineers as the two most advanced capitalist 
countries combined. In science proper, Sir John estimated that the 
Soviet output was about ten times that of the British, and that the 
Russian scientists were fully as well trained as their British coun- 
terparts. 
But maybe the capitalist countries are doing something to catch 
up in this all important field of education? If so, there are few 
enough signs of it. T h e  secret of the Russian program, of course, is 
to train and vastly expand the number of teachers. To this end, 
teachers are treated with the greatest respect and are among the 
highest paid groups in Soviet society. The best graduates are enticed 
and urged into teaching: I have even head from an American doctor 
who recently visited the Soviet Union that in medicine the top 3 
to 5 percent of each graduating class is not permitted to practice but 
is, so to speak, drafted into the medical schools. How is it with us? 
How do we treat our teachers? What inducements do we offer to 
young men and women to enter the teaching profession? 
Alas, I a m  afraid I hardly need speak of these matters to an 
audience like this. Whether f a d t y  or students searching out what 
career to follow in life, you know all too well the answers to these 
questions. I will simply quote a few brief passages from a letter I 
happened to see in the San Francisco Chronicle (April 24) when I 
was recently in that beautiful city. It is signed by "A Math Pro- 
fessor, PhD." : 
. . . A teacher of science in the Soviet Union is reported to 
have an income in the very highest brackets, as compared with 
other occupations, whereas in the Udted States a teacher of 
science usually finds himself in the lowest income bracket; often 
he finds it impossible to maintain his family on a minimum 
living scale. . . . I have myself axrived at a certain eminence, with 
my Ph.D. in mathematics along with ten yeare of actual en- 
gineering experience besides 12 highly successful years as a pro- 
fessor. . . . Accordingly, I have been honored by the offer, which 
I have just accepted, to assume the position of chairman of the 
mathematics department of a leading private university on the 
West Coast. The job pays $5,500 a year. My son-in-law, who 
@uated from high school a few years ago and is now a book- 
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keeper, eams almost precisely the same amount. . . . Let us face 
the result: an economy which cares so little about its professors 
of science as to place them on a bottom rung is not entitled to 
ask for a leading world position in science, and we shall not 
achieve it. 
It is o sad &my, but ali too easy to understand. There is no 
profit to be made out of education-not directly anyway. And 4t 
is p f i t  that @Eks a eapitalist society. As long as we have capitalisni, 
we shall uhdoubtedly treat our teachers 9s second-class citizens, rtlisl 
educationally we shall fall farther and farther behind a society whi& 
p~lQ '&enoe and education abme dollars. 
We come finally to the question of liberty. Here the advanced 
capitalist countries started with an advantage over the Soviet Union 
no less enormous &an in the field of economics. And on the whole, 
diq have succeeded in preserving their lead more successfully he& 
&an m economics. The Soviet police state certainly has an unenviable 
record of arbitrary arrests, trials, purges, shootings, labor camps, and 
all the rest-you are much more familiar with this than with the 
Soviet Union's record in production and education. The question 
for the future really is whether these are necessary features of social- 
ism as such or whether they result from Russia's dark past, from 
the aknost unimaginable difficulties of building an industrial economy 
in a bckward country against implacable outside hostility, and from 
the tensions and fears of a world in which war is an ever-present 
lilreat. L - 
.?'bg~ i s  no- certain way of answering this question yet. I can 
only say that a9 a con*& socialist3 I see no reason for desp* 
and *every reason for hap.. I do not myself attribute much of the 
Swkt Union's qwrd ip &e h i d  of liberty to the wil doings of any 
one man, inch@. One-gum interpretations of history a& 
too easy-and r d I y  -explain nothing. And yet there is no doubt that 
the last few years, which happen to be the years since Stalin's death, 
have witnessed a d d d 1 6  change in the Soviet world, and the 
pace of this change has been sharply stepped up in recent m o n h  
Many of the abuses of the past we-& shar@y denounced at the Febru- 
ary Congress of the Communist Party. Since then, we have been 
told that a aav judicial code is soan to be promulgated which will 
bring the USSR closer to our idea of a government of laws rather 
than of men. The labor camps have mostly been c l ~ e d ~  and it has 
just been announced that they will soon be abolished altogehcr. 
Workers can nav leave their jobs by simply giving two weeks mtla 
A friend of mine who is a profasor at Stanford University hap@ 
to be in MOSCOW on his way to India in December and again in 
~ a k h  on his way back. He reports that the wfiole atmaphere¶ 
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especially the attitude toward foreigners, had undergone a startling 
change for the better. 
Is all this merely a temporary aberration, or is it the beginning 
of a new trend toward liberalization in the socialist countries? I 
myself firmly believe the latter to be the correct interpretation. And 
I think the cause is clear: the forced march in the economic sphere 
is drawing to a close; Soviet citizens now constitute one of the best 
educated publics in the world; the achievement of atomic parity with 
the United States has given them an unprecedented feeling of se- 
curity; and the Soviet Union, far from being isolated, is now sur- 
rounded by friends and allies, including the most populous country 
in the world. The preconditions for internal relaxation and liberali- 
zation are there. What is especially encouraging to all who love 
liberty, and that certainly includes the vast majority of the world's 
socialists, is that relaxation and liberalization are actually happening. 
I believe that the trend is here to stay, barring another war 
which I think increasingly less likely. In the long run, it will present 
capitalism with the greatest challenge of all. Up to now, the de- 
fenders of capitalism have always been able to counter arguments 
for socialism with the reply: "Look at the slave labor camps in 
Russia!" And there's no doubt that it has been an effective a~gument. 
Now, however, the camps are disappearing. Suppose all that they 
symbolize also disappears? Suppose socialism shows what Marxists 
have always maintained, that it is possible to have economic collec- 
tivism and freedom? Suppose the socialist world overtakes and sur- 
passes the capitalist world not only in production and per capita 
income, not only in education and science, but also in freedom and 
respect for the dignity of the individual? What then? 
You may think these questions fantastic now. Perhaps. But let 
me make a suggestion. Let me propose that you file them away in 
the back of your mind and then bring them out, say once every year, 
and check the answers you are able to give on the basis of the latest 
facts available to you. I have no doubt what the answers will be, 
sooner or later. If I am right, it will be facts and not my arguments 
that will convince you. And I am very glad to leave it to the future 
to decide. 

POWER ELITE O R  R U L I N G  CLASS? 
BY P A U L  M. SWEEZY 
There is a sort of contrived bloodlessness about American aca- 
demic social science today. Its practitioners are much better trained 
than they used to be, but the consequence is not only technical com- 
petence. No less str ik ing is the way they all fit into a few neat molds, 
like the models of an automobile coming off the factory assembly 
lines. They talk alike, deal in the same brand of trivialities, and 
take each other enormously seriously. Above all, there is a kind of 
tacit conspiracy to banish all really interesting and important issues 
from the universe of c'scientific" discourse. 
Against this background, C. Wright Mills, Associate Professor 
of Sociology at Columbia University, stands out as a man of courage 
and imagination, an iconoclast who cares little for the sacred cows 
of university administrators and foundation trustees, an innovator 
who wants to get along with the important business of understanding 
the United States of America in the middle of the twentieth cen- 
tury. In White Collar: The American Middle Clacsss, he explored 
the emotional and cultural wasteIands of American society. NOW, in 
The Powm Elite (Oxford University Press, $%LOO), he goes a step 
farther and asks who really runs the show and what makes them 
tick. The result is an absorbing book that has the added fascination 
which always attachq to forbidden topics. 
The plan of Ma' book k as follows: He opens with a chapter 
("The Higher Circles") which -gives a general sketch of the theme 
of the work as a whole. There then follow nine chapters devoted 
to analyzing the Higher Ck1m fnrm various angles and by various 
breakdowns: Local Society, Metropolitan 400, The Celebrities, The 
Very Rich, The Chief Executives, The Corporate Rich, The War- 
lords, The Military Ascendancy, and The Political Directorate. Fin- 
ally come five chapters of interpretation aod argumentation: The 
Theory of Balance, The Power Elite, The Mass Society, The Con- 
servative Mood, and The Higher Immorality. There is no compelling 
logic to the organization of the material, and rigor and elegance 
are not among Mills' outstanding virtues as a writer. The result is 
that the book contains not a few asides and excursions, much repe- 
tition, and considerable excess verbiage. The whole work would 
have benefited from a severe editing, and its impact on the reader 
would, I think, have been sharpened and intensified if it had been 
cut by, say, a quarter to a third. 
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Perhaps the greatest merit of The Power Elite is that it boldly 
breaks the tabu which respectable intellectual society has imposed 
on any serious discussion of how and by whom America is ruled. 
Those of us who inhabit what may be called the radical underworld 
have, of course, never been constrained by this particular tabu, but 
it must be admitted that radicals have produced very little of scientific 
value in recent years, and even work that does meet minimum 
standards of competence has been pretty effectively smothered. In 
contr* The power Elite, written by a professor at a respectable uni- 
versity and brought out by a properly conservative publishing house, 
has already been widely reviewed in such media as Time and The 
Saturday Review of Literature, and seems certain to provoke con- 
troversy among Mills' professional colleagues. For the first time in 
a long while, the literate public has been exposed to a serious dis- 
cussion of social power and stratification at the national-as distinct 
from the local-level, and currently fashionable theories of the dis- 
persal of power among many groups and interests have been bluntly 
challenged as flimsy apologetics. This is all to the good, and we may 
hope that Mills' example will be not only heeded but also emulated 
by other academic authors and established publishers.+ 
The fact that it raises crucially important issues is by no means 
the only merit of The Power Elite. Indeed, a reviewer cannot pre- 
tend even to list all the book's many excellencies: to appreciate 
them, one must read and study it with the care it deserves. But I 
do want to call attention to certain features which struck at least 
one reader as particularly noteworthy: 
( 1) There are numerous flashes of insight and happy formula- 
tions which not only enliven the narrative but, more important, 
help us to understand difficult or obscure problems. It would be hard 
* Let me take this occasion to express a subsidiary hope that writers like 
Mills will become even bolder in challenging the tabus of respectability. 
Ever since it was founded in 1949, Monthly Review has consistently sought 
to analyze and clarify the problems of national power in American society- 
not, I hope, without throwing out some useful and interesting suggestions. 
Mills makes generous reference in his notes to our analysis of "The Roots 
and Prospects of McCarthyism" (MR, January 1954) but otherwise fails to 
note, even in a bibliographical way, any of the numerous articles and edi- 
torials which have dealt with one or more aspects of his chosen subject. Of 
course, it is possible that Mills may not be familiar with this material or 
may consider it of no value. A more likely explanation of his ignoring it, 
I think, is a (perhaps unconscious) fear of what might be called "guilt by 
citation." At any rate this fear is certainly common enough in academic 
circles nowadays, whether or not it was operative in Mills' case. Erom the 
point of v i m  of the 'power elite," it serves the useful purpose of helping 
to isolate radicals and censor radical thought. From the point of view of 
scientific discussion and advance, needless to say, its effects are wholly 
negative. 
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to find a juster or more damning description of our postwar intel- 
lectuals than "those who have abandoned criticism for the new 
American celebration." (P. 25.) I t  is more than merely salutary to 
be reminded that "class consciousness is not equally characteristic 
of all levels of American society: it is most apparent in the upper 
class." (P. 30.) Much of the restless movement of the United States 
today is illuminated by the statement: "To succeed is to leave local 
society behind-although certification by it may be needed in order 
to be selected for national cliques." (P. 39.) How vividly the con- 
nection between wealth and social standing comes out in this re- 
mark: "All families would seem to be rather 'old,' but not all of 
them have possessed wealth for at least two but preferably three 
or four generations." (P. 49.) And how very apt and accurate is 
the designation of our present-day corporate system as an "apparatus 
of appropriation" (p. 107) which showers on its beneficiaries all 
kinds of blessings in addition to their take-home pay. (Mills is right 
to emphasize this theme in several different contexts: my only cri- 
ticism is that he doesn't emphasize it enough.) These are but a 
few random samples, taken from the first quarter of The Power Elite, 
of what I mean by "flashes of insight and happy formulations." 
They are among the real pleasures and rewards of the book. 
(2) Equally impressive is the factual material which Mills has 
assembled and analyzed in support or illustration of his arguments. 
He has made good use of the specialized work of social scientists- 
for example, H. B. Hollingshead's Elmtown's Youth and Dixon Wet- 
ter's The Saga of American Society-but for the most part he relies 
on original research in the current press and biographical sources. In  
this connection, he presents a number of statistical and semi-statistical 
studies which are important contributions in their own right and 
which should go far toward exploding some of the more popular and 
persistent myths about the rich and the powerful in America today. 
Chapter 5 on "The Very Rich" is essentially such a study, and there 
are others of a somewhat less ambitious nature in most of the chap- 
ters which undertake to categorize and describe "the power elite." 
Mills is well aware that an individual researcher, even with con- 
siderable help from friends, students, and assistants, can hardly hope 
to do more than scratch the surface of the vast amount of relevant 
material which exists in this country: he was, in fact, frequently 
obliged to put drastic limits on the scope of his efforts. Nevertheless, 
his factual statements are for the most part solidly, if not exhaustivelv, 
supported; and in a field which is not likely to benefit from the 
generosity (or curiosity) of the well-heeled foundations, we shall 
probably have to remain content with the contributions of indi- 
vidual researchers. One could only wish that they were all as careful, 
competent, and imaginative as Mills. 
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(3) It seems to me that Milk speaks with the voice of an 
authentic American radicalism. He is highly critical of tho American 
system and frequently lays about him with strong adjectives, heavy 
sarcasm, and biting invective. But he doesn't hate "the M c a n  
way of life" and t& his back on it, as so many of our foreign critics 
do; and he h ' t  overawed by foreign authority, as so many of our 
native radials have always been. One gets the impression that Mills 
not only undemtands but to a considerable extent men shams the 
p r e d a ~ n f t  values of the American "mass society." He indulges 
in of the currently farhionable deprecation of ''materialism," 
and his attitude toward wealth is well indicated in a pauage which 
is worth quoting at some length: 
The idea that the millionaire finds nothing but a sad, 
empty place at the top of society; the idea that the rich do not 
know what to do with their money; the idea that the successful 
become fined up with futility, and that those born successful are 
poor and little as well as rich-the idea, in short, of the dis- 
consolateness of the rich-is, in the main, merely a way by 
which those who are not rich reconcile themselves to the fact. 
Weal* in America is directly gratifying and dtectly leads to 
many further gratificatior~~. 
To be truly rich is to posse%;s the means of redking in bii 
ways me's little whims and fantasies and sicknesses. "Wealth 
has great privileges," Balzac once remarked, "and the most 
enhkde of them all is the power of carrying out thoughts and 
feelings to the uttermost; of quickening sensiiility by fulfilling 
its myriad caprices." The rich, like other men, are perhaps more 
simply h~man than otherwise. But their toys are bigger; they 
have more of them; they have more of them all at once. 
(4. 163-1M.) 
The same idea is more simply summed up in a statement quoted 
from Sophie Tucker (without either approval ot disapproval in the 
context)-: "I've been rich and I've been poor, and believe me, rich 
is best." (P. 346.) For a radical, the corollary of this attitude is that 
it is not wealth that is wrong with America but poverty, and that 
what is reprehensible about the rich is not that they enjoy the good 
things of life but that they use their pown to maintain a system 
which needlessly denies the same advantages to others. Wls, to be 
sure, doesn't spell this out, but I think it is undeniably implicit in 
his whole position. 
It is easy to criticize this point of view, and indeed much of 
h a t  Mills &self says about the irresponsibility, mindlessness, anand 
immorality of "the power elite'' would furnish the basis of a damn@ 
indictment of wealth in a context of exploitation, an indictmezit 
which Mills conspicuously fails to elaborate in any thorough or sp 
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tematic way. But I think that Mills' weaknesses in this connection 
are characteristically American and that for this reason they have 
much to teach us about the possibility and requirements of an ef- 
fective American radical propaganda. Denunciations of wealth as 
such, in the earlier tradition of radical thought, are likely to fall 
on deaf ears in this country today: rightly or wrongly, most Ameri- 
cans approve of it and want more for themselves. A successful radical 
movement must convince them that it really has more of it to offer 
the great majority of them than has the present system of waste 
and plunder. 
(4) Mills perfoms a very valuable service in insisting, empha- 
tically and at times even dogmatically, that what happens in the 
United States today depends crucially on the will and decision of a 
relatively very small group which is essentially self-perpetuating and 
responsible to no one but its own membership. And in upholding 
this position, he earns our gratitude by a forthright attack on the 
social harmonics of our latter-day Bastiats such as J. K. Galbraith 
and David Riesman. Galbraith and Riesman are able social scientists 
and keen observers of the American scene, but their overall "theories," 
for which they have received so much praise and fame, are childishly 
pretentious and superficial. It  is high time that a reputable member 
of the academic community should say so. Some day American social 
scientists will acknowledge the debt they owe to Mills for having 
been the first among them to proclaim in no uncertain terms that 
the king is naked. 
I do not mean to imply by this any blanket endorsement of 
Mills' theoretical contributiohs. As I hope to show immediately, Mills' 
theory is open to serious criticism. But he has the very great merit 
of bringing the real issues into the open and discussing them in a 
way that any one can understand; and he refuses to condone the 
kind of slick cover-up job that so many of his academic colleagues 
have been helping to put over on the American and foreign publics 
in the years of the ''American celebration." 
It is not easy to criticize The Power Elite from a theoretical stand- 
point for the simple reason that the author often states or implies 
more than one theory on a given topic or range of topics. Some- 
times, I think, this arises from haste in composition and a certain 
intellectual sloppiness or impatience which seems to characterize 
much of Mills' work. Sometimes it seems to result from acceptance 
of the substancd as well as the terminology of a kind of "elitist" 
doctrine which is basically antithetical to the general trend of his 
thought. And sometimes, no doubt, it arises from the fact that 
Mills, like most of the rest of us, has not made up his mind about 
all the problems of American social structure and finds himself with 
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conflicting ideas rattling around in his head. In the brief space 
available here, I cannot attempt to untangle these confusions and 
- contradictions, nor can I presume to say which of various possible 
interpretations most accurately reflects - Mills' true meaning. Rather, 
I shall concentrate on trying to show what's wrong with certain 
ideas, adding in advance an invitation to Mills to correct me to the 
extent that -I am wrong in attributing them to him or to make any 
other rejoi,nder he may think called for. 
Mills starts off with a concept of the power elite which is dis- 
armingly simple. Those who occupy the "command posts" of our 
major- - economic, military, and political institutions constitute the 
power elite-the big shareholders and executives of the corporate 
system, the generals and admirals of the Pentagon, and the elected 
and appointed officials who occupy political positions of national sig- 
nificance. But this of course tells us nothing about the men who 
stand at these posts-how they got there, their attitudes and values, 
their relations with each other and with the rest of society, and 
so on-nor does it provide any but an admittedly misleading clue 
to these questions: Mills himself repeatedly rejects the notion that $;a 
the power elite in his sense constitutes some sort of natural aristocracy 
of ability and intelligence, in spite of the common connotation of 
the term "elite." 
Having in effect defined the power elite as composed of the big 
shots of industry and government, Mills' next task is to devise a 
theoretical scheme within which to locate them and to guide his 
empirical investigations into their characteristics and habits. Two 
general approaches readily suggest themselves, and Mills follows them 
both without ever clearly distinguishing them, without asking how 
fir and in what respects they may be in conflict, and without any 
systematic attempt to reconcile their divergent results. The first ap- 
proach is via social class: the hypothesis can be put forward and 
tested that those who occupy the command posts do so as repre- 
sentatives or agents of a national ruling class which trains them, 
shapes their thought patterns, and selects them for their positions 
of high responsibility. The second approach is via what Mills vari- 
ously calls the "major institutional orders" (e-g., op p. 269), the 
"major hierarchies" (p. 287), the "big three domains'' (p. 288), 
and other more or less synonymous terms. This assumes that there 
are distinct spheres of social life-the economic, the military, and 
the political-each with its own institutional structure, that each of 
these spheres throws up its own leading cadres, and that the top 
men of all three come together to form the power elite. 
Now there may be societies, past or present, in which this idea 
of more or less autonomous orders, hierarchies, or domains has enough 
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relevance to make it a fruitful approach to problems of social struc- 
ture and power. But it seems perfectly clear to me that the United 
States is not and never has been such a society. Moreover, the 
cumulative effect of the empirical data presented by Mills is de- 
cbively against any such interpretation of the American system. He 
adduces a wealth of material on our class system, showing how the 
local units of the upper class are made up of propertied families and 
how these local units are welded together into a wholly self-conscious 
national class. He shows how the "power elite" is overwhelmingly 
(and increasingly) recruited from the upper levels of the class system, 
how the same families contribute indifferently to the economic, mili- 
tary, and political "elites," and how the same individuals move easily 
and almost imperceptibly back and forth from one to another of 
these "elites." When it comes to "The Political Directorate" (Chap- 
ter lo), he demonstrates that the notion of a specifically political 
elite is in reality a myth, that the crucial positions in government 
and politics are increasingly held by what he calls "political out- 
siders," and that these outsiders are in fact members or errand boys 
of the corporate rich. 
This demonstration in effect reduces "the big three" to "the big 
two"-the corporate and the military domains. There is no doubt 
at all about the decisive importance of the former, and Mills makes 
some of his most useful and interesting contributions in discussing the 
wealth, power, and other characteristics of the corporate rich.* 
But the evidence for an autonomous, or even semi-autonomous, mili- 
tary domain of comparable importance is so weak that it can be said 
to be almost nonexistent. Historically, to be sure, the military has 
normally been somewhat separated from the main stream of American 
life, and in this sense one could perhaps speak of a military domain. 
But it has been small and completely subject to civilian control, 
quite impotent in' terms of the national decision-making which is the 
special function of Mills' power elite. In wartime, of course, the mili- 
tary has swelled enormously in size and power, but it is precisely then 
that it has ceased to be a separate domain. The civilian higher circles 
have moved into commanding military positions, and the top brass 
has been accepted into the higher circles. What happens in such 
times is that the "power elite" becomes militarized in the sense that 
it has to concern itself with military problems, it requires military 
skills, and it must inculcate in the underlying p~pdatien gpater re- 
spect for military virtues and personnel. 
* The three chapters entitled "The Very Rich," "The Chief Executives," and 
"The Corporate Rich" are not really about different groups. They are simply 
about differently constructed but widely overlapping samplings of what is 
essentially a homogeneous social s t n t u m  which can be aptly designated as 
"the corporate rich." 
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All this has nothing in common with the rise to power of a 
military order headed by an elite of 6cwarlords," though it is in these 
terms that Mills describes what has been happening in the United 
States since the beginning of World War 11, and indeed must describe 
it or else abandon the whole theory of a composite power elite made 
up of separate "dornainal" ewes; for on his own showing the 'cpolitical ' 4 
directorate" is merely an-emamition of the corporate rich. To sup- 
port the theory of "The Warlords" (Chapter 8) and "The Military 
Ascendancy" (Chapter 9 ) ,  Mills brings forth little evidence beyond 
the well-known facts that the military trade has traditionally re- 
quired a specialized training and code of conduct, and that the 
Patagon i s  an important center of power in American life. But 
these facts require no such fancy interpretation and are perfectly 
compatible with a more prokc theory of the locus of power in mid- 
twentieth-century United States. 
- But Mills really relies much less on facts than on a sort of un- 
stated syllogism to back up his warlord-military ascendancy theory. 
The syllogism might be formulated as follows: the major outlines 
of American policy, both foreign and domestic, are drawn in terms 
of a 'Snilitary definition of world reality" which has been accepted 
by the power elite as a whole; this military definition of reality (also 
refenred to as "military metaphysics") must be the product of the 
professional dlitary mind ("the warlords") ; a g o  the warlords now 
occupy a decisive position within the power elite ("the military as- 
cendancy"). This may look impressive and convincing at a first 
glance, but a moment's reflection will show that it explains nothing 
and c~mtitutes no support whatever for Mills' theory. Professional 
military people naturally think in militaty terms and have doubtless 
always tried to persuade others to see things their way. Throughout 
most of United States history, they have succeeded, if at all, only 
in wartime. The real problem is to understand why it is that since 
World War I1 the whole "power elite" has come to think in- 
creasingly in military terms and hence to accord a place of greater 
honor and power to the military. Without an answer to this, alI the 
facts that seem to Mills to add up to the "military ascendancy" of 
the "warlords" remain quite unexplained. 
Now Mills himself never faces up to this question, and the only 
relevant answer I can find is that the United States now, unlike in 
the past, lives in a "military neighborhood" (the phrase is used on 
a number of occasions), which presumably means that the country 
is under constant threat (or potential threat) of attack and military 
defeat. This is more sophisticated than kaying that we live in mortal 
danger of red aggression, but its explanatory value is exactly the 
same: in either case the increasing militarization of American life 
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is the result of external forces. The rise of the warlords, then, is 
seen as the outcome of a world historical process for which the 
United States has no responsibility and over which it has no control, 
and not, as Mills clearly wants to prove, as the outcome of internal 
forces operating in the military domain. 
Thus, while Mills appears to have. little in common with the 
cold-war liberals, and -in fact rather generally holds them in contempt, 
his theory of the role of the military leads to very much the same 
concIusions. I believe that this is no accident. "Elitist" thinking 
inevitably diverts attention from problems of social structure and 
process and leads to a search for external causes of social phenomena. 
Simon-pure elitists like Pareto and his followers frankly adopt this 
method and find what they are looking for in the alleged natural 
qualities of their elites. Semi-elitists like Mills-people who think they 
can adopt the terminology without any of the basic ideas of elitist 
theory-tend to get bogged down in confusion from which the only 
escape is to borrow the most banal ideas of their opponents. 
I t  is too bad that Mills gets into this kind of a mess, because, 
as I indicated above, his work is strongly influenced by a straight- 
forward class theory which, if he had stuck to it and consistently 
explored its implications, would have enabled him to avoid com- 
pletely the superficialities and pitfalls of elitist thinking. The upper- 
most class in the United States is, and long has been, made up of 
the corporate rich who directly pull the economic levers. Prior 
to the Great Depression and World War 11, the corporate rich left 
political and military matters largely (though by no means ex- 
clusively) in the control of hired hands and trusted agents; but since 
the highly dangerous economic breakdown of the 30s, the Big Boys 
have increasingly taken over the key positions themselves. Their 
unwillingness to solve the economic problems of capitalism through 
a really massive welfare state program meant that they welcomed 
the war as the salvation of their system. Since the end of World War 
11, they have accepted, nay created and sold through all the media 
of mass communications, a "military definition of reality" as the 
ideological-political underpinning of the war-preparations economy, 
which remains crucial to the whole profit-making mechanism on 
which their wealth and power rests. For this purpose, they have 
lavishly subsidized and encouraged the military, which in turn has 
not only grown vastly in size but also has been enormously flattered 
and has become the most loyal defender and promoter of the "free 
enterprise" system. The picture of "warlords" exercising a "military 
ascendancy" is fanciful : our warlords have no fundamental values 
or purposes different from those of their corporate colleagues; many 
of them perform virtually indistinguishable jobs; and the crowning 
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achievement of a military career today is the board chairmanship 
of a billion-dollar corporation.* At the same time, we have nothing 
even approaching a unified military order or caste seeking to impose 
its "military metaphysics" on the nation. The most famous of our 
"warlords," President Eisenhower, is now the most peaceful of our 
influential politicians; while our most strident "militarists" are 
civilian Senators Symington and Jacks~n whose closest affiliations 
would seem to be with the multi-billion-dollar aircraft industry. 
No, the facts simply won't fit Mills' theory of three (or two) 
sectional elites coming together to form an overall power elite. What 
we have in the United States is a ruling class with its roots deeply 
sunk in the "apparatus of appropriation" which is the corporate 
system. To understand this ruling class-its metaphysics, its purposes, 
and its morals-we need to study, not certain ccdomains" of American 
life, however defined, but the whole system of monopoly capitalism. 
A large 
view. This, 
a vital and 
part of Mills' theory and most of his facts support this 
indeed, is why his book, for all its weaknesses, is such 
powerful document. Let us hope that in the future he 
will drop all the elitist nonsense and make the contribution he is 
capable of making to deepening our theory and understanding of 
the American class system.+* 
In conclusion, I should like to comment very briefly on four of 
the many issues which would merit detailed discussion in a full-dress 
review of The  Power Elite. 
( 1 )  Because he blurs the whole problem of class and class 
relations, Mills fails to throw any but incidental light on the dynamics 
* On this whole range of topics, see the fascinating article entitled ccThey're 
Masters of Buying By the Billion" in Business W e e k  for June 23, 1956. 
"They" are Generals C. S. Irvine and E. W. Rawlings, in charge of pro- 
curement and supply for the Air Force. Mr. Dudley C. Sharp, civilian As- 
sistant Secretary of the Air Force, is quoted as saying: "These two could 
run any business in the world. They're absolutely the finest executives I've 
ever met." Chances are, too, that they will end up running one or more 
of the world's biggest businesses! 
** Mills' reasons for rejecting the ruling class concept are stated in a foot- 
note (p. 277) which deserves no more than a footnote in reply. "Ruling 
class," he says, is a "badly loaded" phrase in the sense that it contains the 
theory that "an economic class rules politically." What of it? The question 
is whether the theory is applicable to the United States today, and if in- 
vestigation shows that it is, then the only ccloading" is on the side of truth. 
As I have argued above, most of Mills' factual material supports the ruling 
class theory to the hilt-provided only that one doesn't insist on interpreting 
the words cceconomic" and "class" in an impossibly narrow and tortured 
way. For the rest, I have already said enough about Mills' alternative theory, 
repeated in the footnote in question, that a "coalition" of the "higher agents" 
of the ''three domains" constitutes a power elite. (There is, of course, no 
loading at an in the phrase ''power elite"!) 
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of the class system-how people lose high-class status, how new 
members of the ruling class are co-opted, and so on. In this con- 
nection, he completely fails to understand the role of the preparatory 
schools and colleges as recruiters for the ruling class, sucking upwards 
the ablest elements of the lower classes and thus performing the 
double function of infusing new brains into the ruling class and 
weakening the potential leadership of the working class. It is this 
aspect of the American educational system, involving as it does 
fairly generous scholarships and other forms of assistance for the 
bright poor, which is most often and least deservedly praised as 
democratic. 
(2) While Mills' chapter on "The Celebrities" is informative 
and amusing, it is a hopeless muddle from the theoretical point of 
view. The celebrities--of screen, TV, radio, stage, sport-are not an 
integral part of the ruling class or the power elite, and in general 
they do not compete in prestige with the rich and the powerful. On 
the contrary, the rich and the powerful have every interest in building 
up the celebrities, partly because it is good business and partly to 
divert the attention of the underlying population from more serious 
matters. This is all part of what Mills elsewhere calls, in a memor- 
able phrase, "the grim trivialization of American life." Mills' con- 
fusion on these questions-which of course does not prevent him 
from saying many true and penetrating things about them--stems in 
large part from the lack of any clear or usable theory of prestige. 
He treats prestige as a pure magnitude and quite misses the point 
that there are different kinds as well as quantities of prestige and that 
they have different bases and perform different functions in the 
social structure. 
(3) I pointed out above (p. 141) that Mills strongly insists, 
quite rightly in my view, that major national decisions in this 
country are made by a relatively small group of people at the top 
of the social pyramid. But in his concern to drive this point home, 
it seems to me that he goes much too far in the direction of what I 
may call "historical voluntarism." On page 24 of The Power Elite, 
Mills makes the following statement: 
It is . . . true that if most men and women take whatever 
roles are permitted to them and enact {hem as they are expected 
to by virtue of their position, this is precisely what the elite 
need not do, and often do not do. They may call into question 
the structure, their position within it, or the way they are to 
enact that position. 
If this were really true, our only hope of understanding the be- 
havior of the top group would be through psychoanalysis: the ob- 
jectively discoverable pressures and compulsions of the social order 
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which operate on the rest of us would be irrelevant to these august 
Olympians. But of course it is not true, and I make so bold as to 
say that most of the time Mills himself knows it perfectly well. What 
corporation executive can afford to order his behavior without regard 
to his company's profit-and-loss statement ? What American politician 
today can flout the interests of the corporate rich who put him in 
office? What military man can say that the Soviet Union is no 
menace and the United States should set the world an example of 
unilateral disarmament? To be sure, each one of these gentlemen 
can behave in the indicated fashion, provided he is prepared to lose 
his job and with it his power. But this is precisely the point: like 
eveqmne else, the "elite9' have roles to perform, and for the most 
part they are exacting ones: failure means loss of position and power. 
What Mills could and should have argued in this connection is 
that the roles are not, like those of a theatrical performance, com- 
pletely mapped out and rigidly determined in advance. The actors 
have a range of choice which is set by the nature and laws of the 
social structure under which they live, and this range may even in- 
clude such fateful alternatives as that which faced Harry Truman 
in August of 1945, whether or not to drop a bomb that would in a 
single flash snuff out the lives of a quarter of a million human 
beings. "Men make their own history," Marx wrote in the Eighteenth 
Bncmaire, "but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under cir- 
cumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past." 
That is the simple truth, confirmed by mountains of historical and 
personal expefimce alike. Why can't social scientists as reasonable 
and sensible a, C. Wright Mills take it in and hold onto it? 
(4) ~ i n a l ~ ~ ~  a word about a matter which has undoubtedly dis- 
=me left-wing readen of The Power Elite. Mills, they say, 
explodes many myths $ m ~ t  the United States today. He shows that 
the c&ty is run by a tiny irresponsible minority, and that in crucial 
respects the consequence is a drift from bad to worse. But he says 
nothing at all about what can or should. be done about it. 
For my part, I see no d i d  ground for criticism here. We 
should be grateful for such a good book, and we can draw our own 
conchsions h u t  what to do about the situation it reveals. We can 
even go farther and commend Milk for his restraint: we know from 
his association with the magaxhe Dissent that Mills cdders  himself 
a socialist, and we can be pretty sure that under present circum- 
stancar Ths POZVGT Elite -with explicitly stated socialist conclusions 
would nwer have been published, reviewed, and read as it has been 
without thc conclusiorts. 
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For the rest, it is no violation of principle not to set down 
everything in your mind every time you put pen to paper. What is 
a violation of principle is to set down a lot of things that aren't 
true or you don't believe, and on this score, so far as I am able to 
judge, Mills deserves a clean bill of health. 
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